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Abstract 
The overall objective of this study was to examine the Ethiopia’s ethnic based federal experiment whether it has 
been served as a tool for managing or a fuel for the ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia. After the collapse of the military 
regime in 1991, EPRDF adopted ethnic federalism since it was supposed to solve Ethiopia’s chronic ethnic 
inequalities generated by the flawed nation building process of the Ethiopian state. However, ethnic federalism 
since its adoption has had different implications for the country. The project has to be more researched. 
Therefore, the researcher, by taking the Ethiopia’s experiences into account, inspired to examine whether the 
present ethnically based political formation exacerbates or reduces ethnic conflicts throughout the country. The 
study used qualitative research methodology and it was based on an explanatory research design. The researcher 
collected data from secondary sources such as documents produced by EPRDF (the ruling party), opposition 
parties and from related literatures. The qualitative data was analyzed and interpreted qualitatively using words. 
All in all, the study concludes that ethnic based federal experiment has failed to manage ethnic conflicts in 
Ethiopia. It is therefore, recommended that Ethiopia should adopt a territorial federal arrangement to manage 
inter and intra ethnic conflicts in the country. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background of the Study 
According to Lijphart (2002), federalism advocates self-rule and shared-rule in government arrangement with 
the division of powers and responsibilities through constitution between the central and regional governments. 
The philosophy of federalism advocates and maintains the idea that local action in matters of local concern, and 
national action in matters of wider concern.  
The longest lived federal arrangements in the world are experienced in the USA (1789), Switzerland (1848), 
Canada (1867), and Australia (1901). Despite the success of federal experiments in such countries, federalism in 
East Europe and other third world countries has failed miserably (Watts, 2008). 
Ethiopia is a place to many diverse multiple communities with each having its own unique features. These 
identities are identified by their unique language, culture (e.g. way of dressing), religion, way of living etc. 
Diversity is an actual reality that our society is constructed by, considering the fact that the peoples of Ethiopia 
have had the culture of living together with the right to full measure of self-government, including the right to 
secession.  
Since the downfall of the Dergue regime in 1991, EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic 
Party) adopted ethnic federalism as a means of accommodating and managing the complex ethno linguistic 
diversity of the country and thereby reduce conflicts. Since its introduction, ethnic based politics and its effects 
on the country have become a point of discussion and a source of highly intense debate (Gebrehiwet, 2006 and 
Turton, 2005). The Ethiopian government advocated that the only medicine to save Ethiopia from breakdown is 
addressing the national question and create Ethiopia where all nations’, nationalities’ and peoples’ identity, 
language and culture could be equally respected. In addition, the EPRDF leaders claimed that ethnic federalism 
could facilitate a fertile ground for the various Nation Nationalities to have a say in their own affairs (Aalen, 
2006). Cohen (2003) and Kidane (2007), positively viewed ethnic federalism and considered as an important tool 
in managing ethnic tensions in Ethiopia. Moreover, Kymlicka (2006), Lijphart (2002) and Osaghae (2006), 
agreed that ethnic federalism gives self-rule to multiple ethnic groups which can in turn reduce secession of 
regions, hence brings national unity as well as ethnic harmony.  
On the contrary, for Egwe (2003), Mamdani (2005) and Nyong’o (2002) ethnic federalism triggers ethnic 
conflicts, accelerates secession, oppresses individual rghts and eventually leads to the breakdown of countries. 
According to Mazrui (2004), the ethnic federal arrangement of Ethiopia could be a key cause for the “re-
tribalization” of the country. For Ottaway (2007), ethnic-based federalism increases inter-ethnic conflicts rather 
than minimizing ethnic tensions as well as strives. On top of that, Aalen (2006), Vestal (2009) and Walle (2005), 
maintained that federalism based on ethnicity is intentionally designed by the EPRDF government to “divide and 
rule” so as to strengthen its own position. 
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Since 1991 G.C, ethnic federalism has already been implemented in Ethiopia. Despite the introduction of 
ethnically based federal structure, currently, owing to many reasons, diversified, complex and serious identity-
based conflicts are observed in many parts of Ethiopia. Therefore, this study examines whether ethnic federalism 
is used as a tool for managing ethnic conflicts or a fuel for these conflicts in Ethiopia.  
 
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
The July 1991 conference is the first step that facilitated the way for the imposition of ethnic restructuring in 
Ethiopia. In the conference, the TPLF-led EPRDF argued that the future of Ethiopia lies on establishing a state 
form which could guarantee self-administration for multiple identities. The transitional period charter which was 
produced by the conference, made an explicit provision that the right to self-rule up to secession was the 
unconditional right of the ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ of Ethiopia (Article 2, Transitional Charter, 1991). 
For the EPRDF, the main factors for conflict in Ethiopia were the national and class oppression of nationalities, 
undemocratic rule and centralization that rejected the rights of the various ethnic groups to use and promote their 
language, their culture and to determine their affairs. 
After the collapse of the military regime in 1991, EPRDF(current Ethiopian government) adopted ethnic 
federalism since it was supposed to solve Ethiopia’s chronic ethnic inequalities generated by the flawed nation 
building process of the Ethiopian state (Kidane, 2007). The framers of Ethiopian constitution chose ethnically 
based federal arrangement as the key solution to the historic problems and challenges of the country as well as its 
peoples, i.e., as a remedy to a century extended suppression and oppression of identities. The Ethiopian 
government (EPRDF), believed that the only solution that could guarantee the survival of Ethiopia in united and 
peaceful manner is via the introduction of an ethnic federal system that could provide self-determination, 
decentralization and constitutionally guaranteed right to secession for every ethnic groups in Ethiopia. However, 
the ethnic conflicts in various parts of Ethiopia indicated that ethnic federalism has not alleviated ethnic tensions 
as advocated by the EPRDF (Frank, 2009). 
The adoption of ethnic based federalism in Ethiopia by EPRDF has had different implications for the very 
consequence of the country (Gebrehiwet, 2006). For some, ethnic federalism serves as a means to discourage 
inter and intra ethnic conflicts in the country, thus encourages the various ethnic groups to live together 
peacefully. Similarly, a lot of politicians believed that ethnically based federal arrangement is a useful tool to 
manage ethnic conflicts in multinational societies.  
However, for others, ethnic based federalism could lead to breakdown of Ethiopian state since several 
ethnic groups exert pressure on the government and claims for secession. Ethnic federalism limits the ability of 
the national government to manage and coordinate the common areas of interest among the states. This fosters 
and reinforces the political, social, and psychological separation of ethnic groups. As a result, ethnic federalism 
can go out of hand and may lead the country into never-ending ethnic conflicts and eventually to disintegration 
like the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Aalen, 2002).   
The project has to be more researched. Therefore, the researcher, by taking the Ethiopia’s experiences into 
account, inspired to examine whether the present ethnically based political formation exacerbates or reduces 
ethnic conflicts throughout the country and to provide constructive policy recommendations based on the results 
of this study.  
 
1.3. Objective of the Study 
The main objective of the study is to examine the Ethiopia’s ethnic based federal arrangement whether it is used 
as a tool for managing or a fuel for the ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia.  
 
2. Review of Related Literature 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
This study was guided by Primordialism and Instrumentalism theories. 
2.1.1. The Primordialism Approach 
According to Geertz (2003), the primordial theory holds that ethnicity is closely linked to the primordially 
existing groups rooted by kinship and biological heritage. For them, primordial attachments and biological 
features are very crucial in mobilizing ethnic groups. Ethnic communities are extensions of kinship units, 
basically being derived by kinship or clan ties where the choices of cultural signs (language, religion, traditions) 
are made exactly to show this biological affinity. Primordialists maintain that certain groups are connected to 
unique and very close relationships that make a bond from generation to generation with an experience of deeply 
rooted, intimate and eternal belonging. In this way, the myths of common biological ancestry that are a defining 
feature of ethnic communities are to be understood as representing actual biological history. Generally, ethnic 
groups and nations are deeply rooted in human evolutionary psychology. Therefore they are unlikely to be 
superseded. 
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2.1.2. The Instrumentalism Approach  
Instrumentalists see ethnicity primarily as a socially constructed focal point for the purpose of group 
mobilization (Brass, 2009). Brass also argued that ethnicity is created by particular political elites and ethnic 
activists through competition between competing groups for political power, economic benefit and social status 
within multiethnic category. Markakis (2004) argued that ethnicity has become catalysts for political tensions in 
various countries due to two objective factors: competition for resources in condition of great scarcity and the 
role the state plays in controlling the allocation of these resources. 
 
2.2. Understanding Ethnic Federalism 
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) introduced ethnic based federalism as a tool 
to save Ethiopia from disintegration by diverting unending ethic conflict and constant bloodshed that could led to 
the breakup of the Ethiopian state altogether. For the EPRDF’s leadership, therefore, the only solution that could 
guarantee the continuity of Ethiopia in united and peaceful manner is through the introduction of an ethnically 
based federal arrangement that could provide self-administration to each Nation and Nationalities in Ethiopia. 
Thus, ethnic federalism was presented as a choice beyond disintegration or oppression’ (Meles Zenawi, 1994: 
Interview,  Efoyita Magazine). 
The better alternative to relying on force of arms is the mutual consent of the people to live together 
(Nahum, 2004). Similarly, a staunch TPLF’s advocate argues, ‘neither the Amharas and Tigrians nor the Oromos 
have a monopoly to dominate Ethiopia’s political scene on the grounds of dynastic credentials, traditional claims, 
demographic advantages or the advantage of being better endowed with resources. The less endowed and the 
small nations also have legitimate rights to participate in its political process, economic life and in the 
burdensome task of rebuilding it. Thus, in 1991, ethnic federalism was considered as the only option that could 
save the state collapse.  
 
2.3. Ethnic Federalism and Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Ethiopia 
For decades, ethnic based federalism has been deemed as a key tool for reducing inter and intra-ethnic conflict 
and secessionist tendencies in multicultural societies. However, debates on ethnic federalism reflect two strong 
contending views. 
 On the one side, some political scientists argue that ethnic federalism can serve as a means of stabilizing 
multi-ethnic conflicts. These scholars who are exponents of ethnic based federalism advocate that it is a device 
for managing ethnic based conflicts than triggering the existing inter-ethnic conflicts and/or generating the new 
ones. Agnew (2005), for example, believe that ethnic federalism is useful to manage intergroup conflicts that 
could otherwise escalate into direct physical violence thereby led to the creation of multiple small states without 
much viability. Similarly, David and Donald (2008) highlighted that ethnically based federal arrangement can 
play a key role in accommodating and managing political conflicts.  
Andreas (2003) summarized that formerly systematically oppressed and marginalized minority groups in 
Ethiopia are represented at national and state levels. To Horowitz (2005), ethnic Federalism may also be used to 
overcome inter-ethnic conflicts through power decentralization that in turn enhances inter-ethnic coordination, 
and alignments based on shared and common areas of interests. 
On the other hand, there are pessimistic views about the role of ethnic based federal arrangement in 
minimizing inter-ethnic conflicts with in multicultural societies.  There are many politicians who advocate that 
ethnic federalism escalates inter-ethnic conflicts (Martinez, 2008). They strongly believed that ethnic federalism, 
instead of managing ethnic conflicts, leads Ethiopian state into disintegration like the USSR, Yugoslavia, and 
Czechoslovakia.  
 
3. Research Methodology 
In this study, qualitative research method was used because it is effective to explain and understand the 
documents produced by EPRDF, opposition parties and other related literatures from published journals and 
websites about the topic under study.  
This study was conducted based on an explanatory research design for making a detail explanation about 
ethnic based federalism and its impacts towards inter and intra ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia. This research design 
was opted owing to the reason that it enables to connect different ideas and to comprehend the different reasons, 
causes and their effects.  
In this study, since collecting first-hand information from the study area was impossible due to time and 
financial constraints, only secondary sources of data were employed. To this effect, literatures and documents 
were used as secondary sources of data. 
This study targeted Ethiopia, thus data that has been gathered and analyzed represents from 1991 onwards. 
Furthermore, due to many obstacles, targeting some other African countries which introduced ethnic federalism 
was very problematic.  
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Finally, after the mass of words obtained from various sources have been collected, the qualitative data was 
analyzed and interpreted qualitatively using words.  
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
4.1. The adoption of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 
The government of Ethiopia and champions of ethnic federalism advocate that federalism has been introduced so 
as to transform the authoritarian and totalitarian political culture into a democratic state of ethnically based 
federal arrangement (Alem, 2003). Semahegn (2012), similarly supports this idea by saying that ethnic 
federalism in Ethiopia able to transform inter and intra -ethnic conflicts into opportunity though it has been 
facing serious challenges. 
According to the EPRDF government, being the second most diversified country in Africa, Ethiopia has 
adopted ethnic federalism.  Since 1991, the Ethiopian government has introduced ethno-linguistic federal 
political arrangements in order to address the national and land questions of Ethiopian nations and nationalities. 
A number of politicians argued that ethnic based federal arrangement can be a means to reduce the problems 
created by inter-ethnic conflicts (Lijphart, 2002). They believed that whereas the former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia disintegrated during the same period, Ethiopia came up with new arrangement and continue to 
maintain its unity and internal integrity. 
However, there are various opposing views regarding to the roles of ethnic based federalism in Ethiopia in 
relation to managing the multi-ethnic tensions in the country. Hence, the Ethiopian ethnic federalism whether it 
is used as a means to manage ethnic conflicts or escalates such conflicts could be analyzed from the following 
orientations. 
 
4.2.  Ethnic Federalism as a tool for managing ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia 
The Ethiopian government argued that ethnic federalism was deliberately designed so as to mitigate the 
problems of national oppressions and systematic discriminations by the monarchical as well as the military 
regimes. Accordingly, EPRDF used ethnicity as a tool of ethnic mobilization and regional states formation to 
minimize inter-ethnic tensions. 
Some researchers appreciated ethnic federalism for the reason that it gives a fertile ground for various 
ethnic groups to administer themselves, in which many Ethiopian nation nationalities have demanded for 
centuries. Ethnic federalism was very important to address the national question because in the pre-federation of 
Ethiopia there were Ethno-linguistic domination that oppressed the identities, languages and cultural heritages of 
the various ethnic groups of Ethiopia. For others, ethnic based federalism in Ethiopia answered the Ethno-
nationalist call for self-determination including secession.  
According to EPRDF, ethnic federalism is considered as one of the possible ways for resolving multiethnic 
tensions in Ethiopia. Ethically based federal arrangement is perceived as the only appropriate response to end 
inter-ethnic conflicts with in multinational states like Ethiopia. For real, the Ethiopian experience shows that 
ethnic federalism was an effective response to the centuries extended class and national oppressions in the 
country.  
 
4.3. Ethnic Federalism as a fuel for ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia. 
Theoretically, ethnically based federalism is supposed to facilitate a fertile room for political bargaining which in 
turn accommodates common interests thereby ethnic conflicts can be better managed (Chapman, 2003). 
Nonetheless, Ethiopian history witnessed that bargaining and compromise were/are unthinkable since all state 
power rests at the hand of an illegitimate dominant party-EPRDF. Thus, ethnic federalism in Ethiopia failed to 
open opportunities for managing ethnic conflicts; rather it aggravates intra and inter-ethnic tensions as well as 
uncertainties in the state. 
Some opposition political parties, forwarded that the ethnically based federal arrangement in Ethiopia 
triggers ethnic conflicts by constructing the “We” and “Others”, “Ours” and “Theirs” mentality that eroded the 
sincere wish to live together in peace with other ethnic groups. This gives a chance for predatory political elites 
and ethnic activists to mobilize the multiple ethnic groups to march into ethnic based  conflicts (Muhabie, 2015). 
In addition, the unconditional eight to self-determination and power decentralization enables ‘ethnic 
activists’ and ‘political entrepreneurs’ to facilitate inter and intra ethnic conflicts through provoking historical 
grievance. Ethnic based federalism motivated a certain groups to establish its own new regions because of 
inequitable power or resource distribution. 
Africa Report (2009) indicated that ethnic based federal arrangement failed to address the national 
questions since inter and intra ethnic conflicts are deeply rooted and diverted from regional  to lower levels of 
administration. The unhealthy competition and hostility among inter and intra-ethnics have been increasing in an 
alarming rate with the aim of dominating the minor identities which led to control of national budgets and 
natural resources. 
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 Birhanu (2008), witnessed that ethnic based federalism creates atmosphere conducive for ethnic exclusion, 
stereotyping and hostilities. Birhanu summarized that the Ethiopian ethnic federalism can’t accommodate and 
reflect the common good of the Ethiopia Nation and Nationalities rather it is manipulating so as to meet the 
egoistic interest of EPRDF through ‘divide and rule’ policy. As a result, for him, ethnic federalism failed to give 
response to the national question of Ethiopian people.  
Similarly, Keller (2008) concluded that splitting the Ethiopian state into small multiple identities never 
mitigate the nationality problems, rather aggravates it. Moreover, a lot of literatures and empirical analysis 
remarked that ethnic based federalism in Ethiopia led the country into fragmentation by provoking ethnic 
hostilities. As indicated by Brietzke (2005) and Merera (2003), a number of Ethiopians oppose the adoption of 
ethnic federalism from the very beginning, fearing that it disappear the Ethiopian state from the political map of 
the world. 
 
5. The consequence of the inclusion of the secession right in FDRE constitution 
The secession clause of FDRE constitution is probably the most controversial provision of the constitution. That 
is why there is no agreement among scholars, politicians as well as the wider public on the significance as well 
as the impact of this constitutional secession right. Some scholars and politicians emphasizes on the little 
claimed benefit of the right, while others thoughtlessly opposed the secession right and called for repealing the 
sub articles as a whole.  
However, many reports and journals fabricated by the Ethiopian government advocates that the inclusion of 
the secession right in the FDRE constitution has its own pros while documents compiled by the opposition 
parties over weights its cons. As Kreptul in his work (2004), elaborated, in 1998 the other only state that 
specified secession right in its constitution, St Kitts and Nevis conducted referendum for the separation of two 
tiny islands. In which majority but less than two-third Nevis voted for secession. So had the states like St Kitts 
and Nevis constitution put simple majority vote of the people as a requirement to effect secession, Nevis would 
have been seceded from St Kitts. For Kreptul, it can be easily understood that the requirements set for secession 
in the constitution are important and should not be underestimated. 
The EPRDF maintained that the unconditional right to secession is deemed as the best alternative of 
accommodating the interests of minority nationalities or diversity and indication of a working federation or 
democracy. The government also argued that the advantage of including secession right in the FDRE 
constitution is to wisely deter secession and breakup of the state. That can be only done with the intervention of 
central government to prevent the secessionist tendency. By doing so, secession can be made more costly and 
bring the chance of disintegration close to zero. This helps to democratically reduce the chance of ethnic based 
violence and successfully prevent secession and maintain territorial integrity of a state. In such occasion, the 
existence of secession right in the constitution is important to sabotage the secession process itself and will 
contribute to keep the national unity of the country. 
On the contrary, documents written by the opposition parties and other relevant literatures witnessed that 
the secession right granted by the 1995 FDRE constitution has recklessly put simple and easily achievable 
requirement. By considering this, critics of the constitution argued that it is an invitation for disintegration of 
Ethiopia. The right to secession should not be treated neither as the best alternative of accommodating diversity 
nor an indication of a working federation or democracy. Accommodating diversity may not necessarily require 
the granting of an unconditional right of secession. Because many countries are successful in accommodating the 
interests of minority nationalities without constitutionally putting the road map of secession and allowing them 
to secede. For them, problem arises when this right has been applied. So, the effect of the integration of the right 
to secession results in the disintegration of the state. 
 
6. The Way Forward 
Ethnicity is the major or sometimes the only organizing criteria for ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. As Brown 
(2007, apparently said that ethnic based structure that its sub-national units by ethnic names may a cause for 
identity troubles. According to Brown, Ethiopia instead of ethnic federalism, should adopt territorial federalism 
i.e., splitting national territory on the basis of geography and population mix like (Germany, USA, Spain, UK, 
and Nigeria), states that has been largely benefited from it. 
EPRDF believed that Ethnic federalism served as a solution for ethnic conflicts. However, ethnic federalism 
can’t be a panacea to all ailments. Conflicts are bound to be with us always. We can’t eradicate them but we, 
with its weaknesses, can handle, manage or transform ethnic conflicts via ethnic federalism if are happening. It is 
therefore imperative that procedural, normative, and institutional frameworks should be established for a proper 
management of inter-ethnic conflicts. According to the opposition political parties, it is not easy to completely 
discard the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia, as shown by the constant and severe challenges of two major 
opposing and contending groups. The first group is composed by those who claim more ethnic autonomy and the 
second group is those who demand the precedence of individual rights over group rights. Therefore, the 
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opposition political parties like Merera (2003) and other politicians like Martinez (2008) argued that it is 
advisable to consider both demands in order to map out a hybrid federal model that can tone down the major 
predicaments of the ethnic federal. For them, the federal model in Ethiopia needs to consider multiple criteria 
such as geography, socio-economic factors, settlement patterns, population mix and other essential factors in 
delimiting the regional states. Similarly, documents written by the opposition parties hold that canceling the right 
to secession from the Ethiopian constitution in order to prevent the country from the state of fragmentation. 
 
7. Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.1. Conclusion 
From the findings of this study, the following major conclusions were made in line with the objectives. 
The Ethiopian government/EPRDF/ introduced ethnic federalism to address the national questions because 
in the pre-federation of Ethiopia there was ethnic inequalities, civil wars and ethno-nationalist call for self-
determination including secession. The core justification behind the Ethiopian ethnic federalism is to facilitate a 
fertile ground for the various nations and nationalities to have a say in their own affairs with little control from 
the center or any other dominant group. 
Ethnic federalism doesn’t solve inter-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia. Conflicts are occurred here and there 
among ethnic groups in the country. These conflicts causes for the death of many innocent people, the 
destruction of property, and the dislocation of many people. Universities have also become the center for ethnic 
conflicts and are frequently closed due to ethnic clashes. Furthermore, because of ethnic tensions, minorities 
groups are displaced badly from various regions. 
The integration of secession right into the Ethiopian Constitution creates environment conducive for various 
secessionist ethnic groups. Article 39 of the FDRE constitution allowed multiple ethnic groups to self-
administration on the basis of their distinctive ethnic identity. Many secessionist movements have opted for 
secession from Ethiopia by applying the secession right as if clearly stated Ethiopian Constitution.  
The reason why the ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia seems to fail lies not only in the character of the 
Ethiopian constitution, outlined along the ethno-linguistic borders, but also in the historical claims and 
oppositions that the constitution managed to stress. 
 
7.2. Recommendations 
Based on the conclusions drawn from the study, the following recommendations were given: 
Ethnic based federal arrangement enables the various nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia to administer 
themselves and promoting their own culture as well as languages. But, it also generates inter-ethnic conflicts 
provoking the We-ness and They-ness mentality facilitated by political entrepreneurs and ethnic activists. 
Therefore, it is recommended that a system must be created to make political elites responsible for their 
devastating actions they contribute at the expense of national unity.   
The federal structures in Ethiopia should adopt a territory based political arrangement so as to close the 
chapter of historical grievances existed for years among the Ethiopian nationalities, instead campaigning on 
commonly shared values/legacies to promote national unity/ consensus. There should be equitable distribution 
with in various ethnic groups in Ethiopia, since disparity in sharing of power and wealth among the peoples of 
the country led to ethnic tensions in the country. Moreover, the study recommends that the Ethiopian 
government must address the problems of diversity (nationality question) and unfair resource distribution (land 
question), repressive and ineffective governance, corruption and lack of justice, uneven development which are 
the primary factors for ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia.  
The secession right granted by the 1995 FDRE constitution must be repealed and then replace by 
consensual secession which is negotiated secession that happens when the constitution never clearly stipulates 
secession rights. The right to secession should be taken as a last resort if ethnic groups are systematically 
discriminated by others. Ethiopia has to create a “national public” to overcome conflicts caused by recent 
constitution and historical claims of various groups. Finally, the study recommends that it is better to re-arrange 
the ethno-linguistic borders delineated by the constitution, which should be the solution for depoliticizing 
ethnicity. 
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